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Why do public blockchains need formal and effective internal governance 
mechanisms?  
 
by 
Karen Yeung and David Galindo 
 
With the birth and rise of cryptocurrencies following the success of Bitcoin and the popularity of 
'Initial Coin Offerings,' public awareness of blockchain technologies has substantially increased in 
recent years.   Many blockchain advocates claim that these software artefacts enable radically new 
forms of decentralised governance by relying upon computational trust created via cryptographic 
proof, obviating the need for reliance on conventional trusted third-party intermediaries.    
 
But these claims rest on some key assumptions, which this paper subjects to critical examination.  
It asks: can existing mechanisms and procedures for collective decision-making of public 
blockchains (which we refer to as internal blockchain governance) live up to these ambitions? By 
drawing upon HLA Hart's Concept of Law, together with literature from regulatory governance 
studies, we argue that unless public blockchain systems establish formal and effective internal 
governance, they are unlikely to be taken up at scale as a tool for social coordination, and are thus 
likely to remain, at best, a marginal technology. 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
The latest rapid decline in the value of cryptocurrencies following record highs, together with the 
so-called ‘Bitcoin Cash Wars’ between two alternative versions based on competing visions and 
technical architectures1 of the cryptocurrency Bitcoin Cash (itself an offspring of the original 
                                                     
  Interdisciplinary Professorial Fellow in Law, Ethics and Informatics, Law School and School of 
Computer Science, the University of Birmingham, UK, and Distinguished Visiting Fellow at Melbourne 
Law School, Melbourne, Australia. Karen Yeung's research on blockchain governance is partly funded by a 
Wellcome Trust Seed Award in Humanities and Social Science, 'Regulating healthcare through blockchain: 
Mapping the legal, ethical, technical and governance challenges', 210337/Z/18/Z.  This article is based on a 
keynote speech delivered at the ‘Blockchain and Public Policy’ conference, University of Groningen, 29-30 
November 2018. 
 
  Senior Lecturer, School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham and Head of 
Cryptography, Fetch.AI, Cambridge, UK.  
 
1  Bitcoin Cash vs Bitcoin SV: Bitcoin Cash originated as a hard fork of the original Bitcoin blockchain 
with the main goal of increasing Bitcoin’s ledger block size to achieve higher transaction processing rates. 
Bitcoin SV, or Bitcoin “Satoshi Vision”, is the latest Bitcoin hard fork that increases the block size of Bitcoin 
Cash from 32MB to a maximum of 128MB, again to achieve extra transactions rates. At the time of this 
writing the market cap of Bitcoin Cash is about one fourth of that of BitcoinSV (source coinmarketcap.com).  
See Magas (2018) for an account.  
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Bitcoin), has provoked lively discussion in both the policy and technical communities about the 
regulation and governance of public blockchains.2    Yet when commentators speak of ‘blockchain 
governance’ or ‘blockchain regulation’, they may be referring to one or more of the following: (a) 
blockchain as a technology for social coordination (regulation by blockchain) (Yeung 2019) (b) the 
internal governance of the blockchain community itself that comprises the decision-making 
apparatus that determines how the blockchain system operates (internal governance of blockchain) 
or (c) the legal regulation of blockchain systems (external regulation over blockchain by 
conventional law)3.  Yet these three different phenomena are not always clearly distinguished, and 
sometimes conflated, resulting in both terminological and substantive confusion.  
 
This confusion is perhaps partly due to ambiguity associated with the meaning of the term 
‘governance,’ a ubiquitous term appearing in many and varied contexts, yet often referring to 
different phenomena, and which may be rooted in different understandings (Bevir 2011:1).    There 
is a rich and extensive multi-disciplinary literature, beginning from the early 1980s (Levi-Faur 
2012:4), that spans both law and the social sciences concerned with the phenomenon of both 
‘governance’ and ‘regulation’, yet these are not terms of art, and their meaning is often contested.4   
Although both these terms are used in discussions about blockchain,  the concept of governance, 
for the purposes of this paper, refers to a community’s mechanisms and procedures for collective 
decision-making that enable ordered self-rule and is therefore a prerequisite for peaceful social 
cooperation.5     In other words, for the purposes of our analysis, governance refers to the structures, 
institutions and procedures for collective decision-making, and is not to be equated with any form 
of social influence, although this latter understanding is adopted in some academic writing 
concerned with blockchain governance (eg: de Fillipi and McMullen 2018: 5).   Regulation, on 
the other hand, is understood as a sub-set of governance (and hence sometimes referred to as 
‘regulatory governance’).  Regulation refers to intentional attempts within a community to manage 
risk or influence behaviour in order to achieve a pre-specified outcome.6  Thus, while regulation 
refers to intentional action aimed at achieving a specified goal (Black 2001; Black 2014), 
mechanisms for collective decision-making are needed to enable the social co-operation necessary 
for a community to govern itself in a peaceful and orderly manner, and need not be oriented 
towards the achievement of any particular purpose, other than the general purpose of facilitating 
ordered rule.  
 
                                                     
2  See for example Rocco (2018) and Haon (2018). 
 
3  See for example Finck (2018). 
 
4  For example, Van Kersenbergen & Van Waarden (2004) identify 9 different ways of studying 
governance in social scientific literature, describing the study of governance as a ‘growth industry’. 
 
5  This understanding of governance springs from Bevir’s observation that, ‘At the most general level, 
governance refers to theories and issues of social coordination and the nature of all patterns of rule’: Bevir 
2011:1.  
  
6  This conception of regulation reflects our common practice of referring to the regulation of 
particular sectors or domains, such as environmental regulation, financial regulation, workplace safety 
regulation and so forth.   
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This article seeks to critically investigate the internal governance of public (also called 
‘unpermissioned’ or ‘permission-less’) blockchain systems.    Within the technical-developer 
community, a lively debate has emerged in the blogosphere concerning the desirability of ‘on-
chain governance’ - that is, encoding internal governance mechanisms into the blockchain 
protocol, primarily in the design and operation of various approaches to initiating and ‘voting’ on 
specific proposals which are then automatically implemented once the nominated threshold for 
approval has been reached (Lucsok (2018), Polkadot (2019), Tezos (2019)).  While recognition by 
the developer community of the importance of attending carefully to the internal governance of 
public blockchains is welcome and overdue, these debates have hitherto adopted a narrow and 
rather limited perspective, relying almost exclusively on economically grounded and 
mathematically informed game-theoretic approaches7 in which governance is, essentially, 
understood as a ‘game’.  In so doing, they fail to grasp the complex and contested nature, character 
and challenges of governance generally, based on a naïve assumption that internal governance is 
simply a matter of coming up with the right voting design, which would then ‘solve the problem’ 
of blockchain internal governance (cf Finck 2018, Chapter 7).  These discussions display little (if 
any) awareness of the rich and extensive body of work from politics, constitutional law or the social 
sciences more generally, that is concerned with critically understanding the nature and challenges 
of governance in human communities (including but not limited to nation states) and the 
importance of attending to the larger socio-cultural dynamics associated with achieving peaceful 
and constructive community cooperation.   
 
The core argument of this paper is that not only is it, in practice, impossible for public blockchains 
to govern successfully via exclusive reliance on their technical code – but also that, without 
legitimate and effective internal governance of public blockchain systems that rely on formalised 
and effective social mechanisms, they are unlikely to be taken up at scale as a tool for social co-
ordination (ie governance by blockchain), and are thus likely to remain, at best, a marginal 
technology.  Instead, we are more likely to see the widespread emergence of private (ie 
‘permissioned’) blockchain systems, which necessarily require transparent and accountable internal 
governance mechanisms due to the formal authority of those with the capacity to authorise the 
participation of others, and to alter the design and operation of the network.  By undertaking an 
examination of how law governs, we can better understand the essential characteristics which any 
community’s collective decision-making system requires in order to provide a stable, self-
sustaining system of governance. We then demonstrate why a public blockchain that seeks to rely 
exclusively on software code to govern its internal operations lacks these characteristics. As a result, 
they are likely to be unstable and highly volatile, failing to provide satisfactory and enduring 
foundations for the governance of communities at scale (for which the successive splits of the 
Bitcoin community offer a compelling illustration).  
 
2. Current public blockchain governance 
 
In order to understand the role and importance of internal blockchain governance, it is helpful to 
consider first how the internal governance of public blockchains is currently structured, drawing 
primarily on recent academic critiques of Bitcoin’s internal governance structure and operation by 
                                                     
7  A particularly ambitious proposal is that of “Liberal Radicalism”, that seeks to organize some societal 
functions purely by algorithms and game-theory, see Buterin, Hitzig and Weyl (2018). 
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way of illustration.8   To this end,  it is important to recognise that there is no standard template or 
model for the design and implementation of the internal decision-making structures that govern 
the operation of public blockchains.  Rather, this is a matter for the core and founding developers, 
who are in essence technological entrepreneurs: free to design and implement any collective 
decision-making structure they so wish, provided they can establish its technical feasibility.  In fact 
the need for formal decision-making structures and mechanisms to make decisions about the 
current and future operation of public blockchains is not apparent from Nakamoto’s original 2007 
Bitcoin White Paper (or at least, on our reading of it), in which the core foundations of the Bitcoin 
blockchain were famously explicated and publicised.  Nakamoto’s vision for a state-less currency 
relied critically on the operation of a decentralised database stored across a distributed computing 
network, secured through the operation of cryptographic protocols. This vision implicitly rests on 
an unstated assumption and expectation that such a system would be both self-governing and self-
sustaining (Nakamoto 2007).  Nakamoto appears to have envisaged that the distributed computing 
network would be governed by, and operated exclusively through technical code, without the need 
to rely on conventional trusted third-party intermediaries (ie social institutions, comprised of 
humans and thus inescapably flawed, unpredictable and vulnerable to corruption). 
 
It is on this basis that blockchain advocates often argue that public blockchains could radically 
‘democratise’ social organisation by rendering redundant the need for conventional third-party 
social intermediaries (ie. states, banks/financial intermediaries).  This view assumes that the 
blockchain software code and protocols can be relied upon exclusively to regulate the system’s 
internal operation and functioning, so that blockchains can, in turn, be harnessed externally in order 
to co-ordinate interaction between strangers without the need for conventional third-party 
intermediaries.  Yet on closer inspection, this view rests on two related yet distinct assumptions, 
notably, the redundancy of: 
(a) conventional third-party intermediaries (in the form of banks and national governments) 
to achieve peaceful social cooperation among strangers; and 
 
(b) social (ie human) institutions, achieved through replacement of governance by code.   
But while (a) may hold true, at least in terms of the internal operation of these systems, it is now 
clear that (b) does not, thereby undermining the validity of assertions that public blockchain could, 
in practice, radically democratise social organisations.    In particular, Vidan and Lehdonvirta (2018) 
have demonstrated that in practice, the operation and maintenance of the Bitcoin blockchain does 
not rely exclusively on code, but instead relies on ‘hybrid’ forms of control, including technical 
mechanisms in the form of software code but also via economic competition (via the economic costs 
and incentives for mining), informal hierarchy (via the core developers who have privileged access 
rights to amend the core protocol) and user participation (by nodes in deciding whether or not to 
adopt and implement software updates).   Others have vividly demonstrated that the internal 
governance of Bitcoin is both riddled with politics and relies on social structures and human 
decision-making and influence (and their inevitable human frailty) in order to maintain and sustain 
Bitcoin’s operations (Walch 2017, Dodd 2018; Vidan and Lehdonvirta (2018); Lovelace & De 
Filippi (2016); Paech (2017). 
                                                     
8   However, much of what we describe in the following paragraphs about Bitcoin and forks can be 
also applied to the Ethereum permission-less blockchain. 
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Taken together, these studies identify several features that characterise Bitcoin’s current internal 
governance structure and practice.  Firstly, Bitcoin relies on the leadership and decisions of a small, 
elite group of core developers who function, in effect, as an informal ‘executive’.  In open source 
software projects (including public blockchain projects), there is typically a group of ‘core 
developers’ who are more powerful and influential than rank-and-file developers.   For example, 
after Nakamoto handed the role of caretaker of Bitcoin to Gavin Anderson in 2011, there have 
been a handful of core developers who have the passwords to make changes to the core software 
protocol (ie. with ‘commit’ access) even though any developer can propose changes, while 
Ethereum’s founder, Vitalik Buterin, undertakes the role of informal chief executive for the 
Ethereum network.9    Thus the governance of the two largest public blockchains,  Bitcoin and 
Ethereum, involve a high degree of informal centralised power in the hand of technical experts, 
who are not subject to any formal accountability mechanisms nor do they have formal 
responsibility for overseeing the maintenance and operation and revision of the network protocols 
or architecture (Walch 2017).   
 
Secondly, the effective operation of the Bitcoin network is significantly influenced by the actions 
and decisions of individual ‘miners’ (the community of nodes within the network) who direct and 
operate the mining pools through which multiple miners pool their computational power to 
undertake the mining process required to append transactions to the Bitcoin blockchain.   
Although Nakamoto’s vision for Bitcoin was a libertarian one, based on an assumption that the 
task of mining would be democratised and open to all those wishing to transact on the Bitcoin 
network (Vidan and Lehdonvirta 2018:10), in practice, mining has become increasingly 
industrialised in the form of ‘mining pools’ (Botsman 2017: 214). As Vigna and Casey (2015) 
observe,  
 
ever faster, energy-hungry ASIC machines would come onto the market, spurring a relentless arms race 
among miners chasing the finite supply of newly issued bitcoins.  The only way to win that race and 
stay profitable was by creating giant, data-centre based mining farms.  Bitcoin mining doesn’t just need 
hard core processing power, it also needs cheap electricity. So as is often the case, a movement with 
ambitions to return power to individuals, accelerated out of the garage of early enthusiasts, is becoming 
monopolised by centralised power…in which China has become the dominant player, where cheap 
electricity and cheap labour are available.   
 
Thus, although the formal design of the Bitcoin network appears to rest on a distributed network 
of individual computing nodes contributing their processing power, in practice, once the 
underlying political and economic reality of Bitcoin mining is taken into account, its operation 
can be understood as both ‘socially nuanced and politically loaded’ (Dodd 2018: 46). 
 
Thirdly, the stability and continued operation of the network as a single, unified albeit 
decentralised system, is dependent upon the willingness of miners to continue to operate and 
upgrade to the same software code.  This dependency is a matter of considerable importance, given 
that it is a widely accepted tenet of software engineering that software is inevitably prone to ‘bugs’ 
                                                     
9   Buterin who has been described as a ‘benevolent dictator’ over the Ethereum network: Friebe 
(2017).  
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and is never perfect nor finished.  Despite programmers’ best efforts, any software that is intended 
to be used on an on-going basis must be maintained, that is, developers must remain on hand to 
release a patch or a new version each time a critical bug is discovered.10  Furthermore, because 
software interacts with other software and hardware, on-going software maintenance is essential, 
to ensure the proper functioning of interactions if one component is altered.11   Yet because 
individual nodes are not obliged, either by technological compulsion or legal obligation, to 
upgrade their software protocols, owing to the fundamentally decentralised design of the public 
blockchain network, resort to social influence and persuasion is needed to ensure the stability and 
continued functioning of the network as a unified system.  For example, following an inadvertent 
forking of the Bitcoin blockchain in March 2013, Bitcoin’s core developers sought to persuade the 
biggest mining pools to forgo the Bitcoin they had earned from mining via the upgraded software, 
and switch to the old chain (which those miners agreed to do) in order to reverse the fork and 
ensure that only a single blockchain continued in operation (Walch 2017).  Similarly, following 
the infamous DAO hack, a handful of miners refused, for ideological reasons, to upgrade their 
software along the lines proposed and advocated by Ethereum’s core developers in order to reverse 
the effects of the hack, resulting in the continuation of the original blockchain (known as 
‘Ethereum Classic’)12.  Both these incidents demonstrate the extent to which reliance on human 
decision-making and influence is involved in Bitcoin governance and operation, as well as the absence 
of any formal internal mechanism for resolving conflict concerning the network’s operation13.  In 
the absence of any authoritative mechanism for determining disputes, other than through the 
fragmentation of the network in the form of a fork, public blockchains are perpetually vulnerable 
to the risk of forking, and therefore prone to the threat of instability and volatility (Atzori 2017).  
 
In other words, examination of the way in which both the Bitcoin and Ethereum blockchains have 
operated in practice reveals that the reality is much messier and reliant on social mechanisms in 
conjunction with technical mechanisms of control than the mantra (and ideology) of ‘code is law’ 
that is conventionally used to describe the primary (exclusive) modality through which public 
blockchains are internally governed.  The need to resort to informal internal governance 
mechanisms to maintain and sustain its continued operation highlights the extent to which human 
judgement and decision-making plays an important role in Bitcoin’s operation.     As Dodd puts 
it: 
                                                     
10  A prominent example affecting the Ethereum network took place recently, in which a scheduled 
update called Constantinople had to be reversed half-way its implementation by the network when bugs 
therein were discovered by a team of academic researchers. The process followed is consistent with the 
informal governance mechanisms hereby described. See Aniket 2019. 
 
11  As Vidan and Lehdonvirta observe, ‘any live software system is not a static artefact, but an ongoing 
sociotechnical project’: Vidan and Lehdonvirta 2018: 8. 
 
12  Falkon 2017. 
 
13  Finck 2018, Chapter 7. Singh and Chopra make a conceptually similar claim by arguing that the 
inexistence of a universal mechanism to establish the correctness of smart contracts written in a Turing-
complete language (such as Ethereum smart contracts) implies the need to take account of social meaning to 
govern blockchain systems: Singh and Chopra (2018). 
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“[the] reading of Bitcoin – as a horizontal network that simply embeds trust in computer code – misses 
some of the reality of Bitcoin’s actual operation, and replicates the ideology behind it.  As with all 
complex technical systems, social practices are crucial’ (Dodd 2018: 45).”   
Yet these social practices are not only hidden from public view, but fly in the face of Bitcoin’s 
underlying ideology.     Hence de Filippi and Lovelock conclude that  
 
‘the governance of Bitcoin relies almost exclusively on its leaders, lending credit to the view that peer 
production can often lead to the formation of oligarchic organisational forms.  In classic Weberian terms, 
Bitcoin governance consists of a form of domination based on charismatic authority, largely founded on 
presumed technical expertise (2017: 15).  One cannot eliminate politics by technology alone, because 
the governance of a technology is, itself, inherently tied to a wide range of power dynamics.  So Bitcoin 
is mostly an invisible technology that operates mostly in the background. It is therefore all the more 
important to make the design choices lying behind its technical features more visible to shed light on 
the politics implicit in the tech design.’ 
 
3. What enables large diverse communities to govern themselves in a unified, stable 
and self-sustaining manner? 
 
Armed with this understanding of how public blockchains are, at present, internally governed, we 
now consider whether their current internal governance structures and mechanisms can be 
expected to provide stable, self-sustaining social co-ordination.  To this end, we must first attempt 
to identify the necessary preconditions for any such governance system.  Given that modern 
western European legal systems are widely readily regarded as largely operating in this manner 
(albeit imperfectly), our methodological approach involves reflecting on the core traits that 
distinguish modern legal system from their pre-modern predecessors to order to identify and 
propose set of essential characteristics that are needed to produce these governance qualities.14  For 
this purpose, we return to the analytic heart of legal philosophy, by drawing directly on HLA 
Hart’s Concept of Law, with the aim of extrapolating from his analysis.15  We then consider the 
extent to which the design and mechanisms through which public blockchains are currently 
governed possess these essential features, in order to evaluate whether they can be expected to 
provide stable, self-sustaining social co-ordination.   
 
3.1 Hart’s Concept of Law 
 
Hart’s fundamental aim in The Concept of Law was to identify the essential nature and character of 
law, to identify what is distinctive and unique about the legal systems of modern societies (as 
                                                     
14  See Galligan’s account of the ‘functions’ of law which he ascribes to Hart, and Galligan’s scepticism 
about them: Galligan 2005.  
 
15  Hart’s methodological approach rooted in the tradition of analytic jurisprudence has been subject to 
sustained criticism from a variety of perspectives over time. In particular, to acquire a holistic understanding 
of modern legal systems, it is important to supplement this analytic approach with a law and society 
perspective, see for example, Galligan 2005.  Our present purpose in drawing on Hart’s approach is narrow 
and limited: as an illuminating springboard for a critical interrogation of unified and self-sustaining systems 
of governance in order to illuminate the promise and potential of public blockchains, rather than necessarily 
endorsing Hart’s particular theory of law in an uncritical fashion. 
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opposed to systems of ordering in pre-modern close-knit societies, for example, which operate on 
the basis of shared social norms and conventions).  For Hart, a legal system is best understood as a 
unified system of primary and secondary rules: which can only be understood by distinguishing 
between what he refers to as the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ view of rules (which we elaborate on 
below).   He posits that any modern legal system must possess three core elements: 
1) Rules of recognition, that enable the primary rules of the legal system to be conclusively 
identified; 
2) Rules of change; and 
3) An official body to authoritatively adjudicate disputes. 
Each of these elements is discussed more fully next, starting with: 
 
1. Every legal system must have ‘rules of recognition’  
 
According to Hart, every legal system must have a rule for conclusive identification of the primary 
rules of obligation, which he calls a ‘rule of recognition’ (Hart 1994: 95).  Such a rule specifies some 
feature (or features), the possession of which by a suggested rule is taken as conclusive affirmative 
indication that it is a rule of the group to be supported.   Rules of recognition perform the vital 
function of overcoming a major defect of primitive legal systems in which there is often 
uncertainty about the content of the relevant rules.  These rules of recognition may take on a huge 
variety of forms, simple or complex.   What is crucial is the acknowledgement of reference to the 
writing or inscription as authoritative i.e. as the proper way of disposing of doubts as to the existence 
of the rule.  Where there is such an acknowledgement, there is a very simple form of ‘secondary 
rule’ – a rule for conclusive identification of the ‘primary rules’ of obligation (Hart 1994: 95).  
 
2.  Rules of change 
 
According to Hart, every legal system must also clearly specify the method or process for which 
deliberate and authoritative changes can be made to the primary rules, thereby enabling the 
community to deliberately and continuously adapt to changing circumstances and needs.  The 
existence of rules of change overcomes a further defect in primitive legal systems of not being able 
to make deliberate changes to the rules and thus overcomes their static quality.  In the simplest 
form, it is a rule that empowers an individual or body of persons to introduce new primary rules 
for the conduct of the life of the group, or some class within it, and to eliminate old rules (Hart 
1994: 95).  These rules of change might be very simple or very complex, the powers may be 
unrestricted or limited, and the rules might define in more or less rigid terms the procedure to be 
followed in legislation.16 
 
                                                     
16  Hart comments that there is clearly a very close connection between the rules of change and the 
rules of recognition: for where the former exists, the latter will necessarily incorporate a reference to 
legislation as an identifying feature of the rules, though it need not refer to all the details of procedure 
involved in legislation.  Usually some official certificate or copy will, under the Rule of Recognition, be 
taken as sufficient proof of enactment: Hart 1994: 96. 
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3. There must be an official agency to make authoritative determinations (‘adjudication’) concerning 
whether a primary rule has been broken.  
 
The need for an official agency to administer sanctions for the violation of rules overcomes the 
problem of inefficiency, a defect of primitive legal systems in which punishments or other forms 
of social pressure for violation of the rules (involving physical effort or use of force) are left to 
individuals affected or the group at large.  The minimum form of adjudication consists in such 
determinations, and rules which confer the power to make them (or ‘rules of adjudication’).  Such 
rules will identify the individuals who are to adjudicate, and the procedure to be followed.  They 
confer judicial powers and a special status on judicial declarations about breach of obligation.  
These rules again define a group of important legal concepts: in this case, the concept of judge or 
court, jurisdiction and judgement.17 
 
In summary, Hart argued that a legal system is most illuminatingly characterised as a union of 
primary rules of obligation with such secondary rules of recognition, change and adjudication 
(Hart 1994: 98) identifying two minimum social conditions necessary and sufficient for the 
existence of a legal system that possesses these core characteristics:  
 
First, rules of behaviour which are valid according to the system’s ultimate criteria of validity must 
be generally obeyed.  This condition is the only one which private citizens need satisfy.   (They may 
obey ‘for his part only’ and from any motive whatever, though in a healthy society they will in fact 
often accept these rules as common standards of behaviour and acknowledge an obligation to obey 
them or even trace this obligation to a more general obligation to respect the constitution.)  
Secondly, rules of recognition specifying criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and 
adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public standards of official behaviour by its 
officials.  They must regard these common standards of official behaviour and appraise critically 
their own and each other’s deviations as lapses.  (Besides these, there will be many primary rules 
which apply to officials in their merely personal capacity which they need only obey.)18 
 
3.2 Do contemporary public blockchain systems possess these essential elements? 
 
Although public blockchains are neither intended nor designed to operate as legal systems, if they 
are to successfully fulfil the function of coordinating interaction between strangers without resort 
to third party intermediaries, then they must nevertheless operate as stable, self-sustaining co-
                                                     
17  Hart comments that there are intimate connections between the rules of adjudication with the other 
secondary rules.  A system which has rules of adjudication is necessarily also committed to a rule of 
recognition of an elementary and imperfect sort: this is so because if courts are empowered to make 
authoritative determinations of the fact that a rule has been broken, these cannot avoid being taken as 
authoritative determination of what the rules are.  So the rule which confers jurisdiction will also be a rule of 
recognition, identifying the primary rules through the judgements of the courts, and these judgements will 
become a ‘source of law’.  Although such a simple rule of recognition will be very imperfect and be 
inseparable from the minimum form of jurisdiction (Hart 1994: 97) 
 
18  Hart 1994: 117. However, Hart warns that the combination of primary and secondary rules does 
not of itself illuminate every problem, though it is at the centre of a legal system – and as we move away 
from the centre, we must accommodate elements of a different character. 
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ordination systems: qualities which largely characterise modern legal systems.  Accordingly, the 
following discussion considers the extent to which the internal governance structures and 
mechanisms of contemporary blockchains possess the three essential characteristics identified by 
Hart as necessary and sufficient in modern legal systems.  
(a) Rules of Recognition   
Rules of recognition are rules that enable the primary rules of the community to be identified.  The 
primary rules of public blockchains currently consist of its underlying open source software code 
and protocols through which it operates and which are, in principle, available to any user to 
download and run on their local computers.  If, however, there are multiple versions of the 
software, then nodes have freedom to choose which software to run.  Accordingly, public 
blockchains lack secondary rules that definitively prescribe which set of primary rules nodes are 
legally required, morally obliged or technically compelled to adopt.  Instead, most public 
(permissionless) blockchains rely upon economic incentives (encoded into the software protocols) 
that are designed, based on game theoretic insights, to motivate nodes to utilise the version used 
to produce and validate the longest chain, otherwise they risk a rejection of their attempts at 
validation, and will not earn rewards for mining.   Hence, the longest chain rule (which, according 
to the Nakamoto White Paper provides the authoritative version of the distributed record) might 
appear to operate as a primitive secondary rule of recognition, because it serves to identify which 
version of the database should prevail.  However, the longest chain rule is not in fact a ‘rule’ of 
either a legal, moral or technical kind (it is not technologically self-enforcing, in that the longest 
fork does not necessarily ‘kill’ the shorter fork.)  Rather, it is a practice that is expected to emerge 
due to the economic incentives built into the consensus mechanism which Nakamoto anticipated 
would give rise to a ‘longest chain’ rule emerging as a matter of mining practice, based on the 
assumption that economic self-interest would motivate miners to support the longest chain.  In 
practice, however, this has not happened because miners have multiple motivations in deciding 
which software to support, reflected in the recent ‘Bitcoin hash war’ and the continuation of 
Ethereum Classic after a hard fork was recommended by the Ethereum core developers following 
the DAO hack.  In both cases, particularly ideological commitments and views about which 
primary rules will best serve the future of the network resulted in some miners pursuing a mining 
and validation strategy that failed to conform to Nakamoto’s expectations.  So if there are, for 
example, two different versions of the software in use, resulting in the production of two distinct 
‘forks’ or ‘chains of transactions’, miners might continue to validate both chains – with users 
continuing to run the software on the shorter fork, resulting in two different databases continuing 
to operate (that are identical up to the point at which the fork takes place). As a result, the first 
essential property identified by Hart is absent from the internal governance of public blockchains: 
they lack a ‘rule of recognition’ that authoritatively identifies and ensures that only one set of 
software code prevails as the authoritative record, vividly illustrated in the event of a fork.  In the 
event of competing primary rules (embodied in different versions of the blockchain protocol and 
software) is up to individual miners to decide which version of the public blockchain software to 
adopt.  Although there are economic incentives that would result in longest-chain rule prevailing 
if each and every miner operated in a commercially self-interested manner, this has not always 
happened, resulting in ‘hard forks’ and hence multiple ledgers emerging – which may co-exist or 
could lead to one ledger prevailing over the other. 
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(b) Rules of change  
 
While public blockchains have very clear rules that dictate how the ledger itself can be altered, 
which are encoded in the consensus protocols and implemented via the mining process, they do 
not contain any formal procedures through which the primary rules themselves (ie the core software 
protocols) can be changed.  In other words, there are no formal authoritative rules that identify the 
procedure through which changes can be made to the software code and enable the validation of 
transactions and their appending to the ledger.  Instead, there is an informal process through which 
open source software is modified or changed, which relies on the charismatic authority of the ‘core 
developers’ who occupy a position of informal hierarchical authority over other developers. This 
is perfectly illustrated by the process through which Ethereum’s long-anticipated Constantinople 
fork was paused after a security vulnerability was found. As explained in Kim (2019) the decision 
was taken during a conference call amongst the most senior Ethereum developers. Accordingly, 
the second property identified by Hart in any modern legal system is also absent: public blockchains 
lack formal procedures that specify and enable authoritative changes to the blockchain code.  
Rather, core developers have informal power to initiate a change to the code.  But even if they 
issue a software update, this does not guarantee that this updated code will be implemented: because 
it is ultimately up to the computing nodes and miners to decide whether they wish to implement 
the proposed software updates.  Hence the process of changing the primary rules is highly informal, 
unreliable and volatile.  In short, there is no guaranteed way to ensure that software changes to the 
network protocol will be taken up across the network. 
 
(c) Authoritative determinations (adjudication) concerning violations of the primary rules  
 
In technical terms, the primary rules of the software code cannot be ‘violated’ because they are self-
enforcing in nature.  Hence there is no such thing as a technical ‘violation’ of the rules encoded in 
software: they are simply executed in accordance with the terms of the code.  But this does not 
alleviate uncertainty and disputes about whether the technical code itself accurately represents the 
appropriate norms that should govern the particular situation in which the encoded rule was 
implemented.  This problem was vividly illustrated following the DAO hack, in which a hacker 
was able to ‘exploit’ a vulnerability in the smart contract code built on top of the Ethereum 
blockchain to siphon off approximately $US 50 mil to the hacker’s account.  The exploit was not 
a technical violation of the primary rules: it was merely the execution of the primary rules in 
accordance with the software code.   Nevertheless, it clearly constituted a violation of the intention 
of the underlying principles which the DAO and their software developers intended to implement.  
A lively debate ensued: with the majority of participants regarding the exploit as a simple case of 
theft, while hardliners argued that ‘code is law’ and that therefore the hacker should be entitled to 
benefit from the fruits of the hack so that an attempt to implement a hard fork would violate the 
core principle of immutability that lies at the heart of blockchain’s value as a single and ‘immutable’ 
source of truth.  Yet there was no authoritative way to resolve this dispute within the network 
itself: although the core developers recommended and initiated a hard fork via the release of a 
software update which would effectively reverse the effect of the exploit, two independent chains 
carried on after the fork (Ethereum and Ethereum Classic) because some nodes refused to upgrade 
their software and continued to validate and append transactions to the original chain.  Thus, the 
third property identified by Hart as necessary for any modern legal system is also absent: there is 
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no official body within the blockchain network that has the power to authoritatively determine 
disputes concerning the application of primary rules. 
4. Prospects for public blockchains in the absence of reform to their internal 
governance frameworks 
 
The preceding analysis demonstrates that the internal governance framework for public 
blockchains currently lack the core characteristics of modern legal systems.  But should this be a 
matter of concern, particularly given that public blockchains are socio-technical systems built on 
computational code, as they are not intended to create nor operate as legal systems?  How one 
responds to this question depends upon one’s understanding of the promise and potential of public 
blockchains.  If we recall that many blockchain enthusiasts claim that public blockchains could, via 
reliance on the security and immutability of its underlying code, democratise social coordination 
between strangers19, then their capacity to fulfil this function depends upon the capacity of public 
blockchains to operate as unified, stable and self-sustaining systems of governance.  Yet because 
the current internal governance framework upon which public blockchains currently rest lack the 
core characteristics which Hart identifies as essential to modern legal systems, they are prone to 
disunity, instability, fragmentation and ossification, discussed more fully below.  Taken together, 
these qualities suggest that they are therefore unlikely, at least under present internal governance 
arrangements, to become widely taken up as a scalable tool for achieving peaceful social 
coordination between strangers.   
  
4.1 Lack of unity 
The absence of any rule of recognition (or ‘secondary rules’) which authoritatively identify the 
primary rules of public blockchain systems, fundamentally precludes these systems from operating 
as a unified system of governance, with the risk of forking ever-present, in which forks may be 
proposed by any node/user/developer.  There are no formal rules and procedures that identify any 
minimum thresholds or procedural requirements that must be met before proposing a fork.  This 
lack of unity might be at least partly attributable to the critical importance, within modern legal 
systems, of what Hart refers to as the ‘internal point of view’ in understanding the rule of 
recognition.  By this, Hart was referring to the perspective of a member of a group which accepts 
and uses the rule as a guide to conduct.  To illustrate this perspective, he refers to the rules of chess: 
players regard the rules of chess as a common standard for all who play the game, so that if a player 
fails to conform (or threatens to deviate) this this would legitimately attract criticism and demands 
from others.  In a similar fashion, Hart emphasises that the rule of recognition must be regarded 
from the internal point of view as a public, common and correct standard, and not as something 
which each official observes for his or her part only (Hart 1994: 116).   For Hart, this shared and 
common respect and understanding for the rule of recognition is absolutely vital: it is not merely 
a matter of efficiency or the health of the legal system but is logically a necessary condition of our 
ability to speak of the existence of a single legal system.  By providing an authoritative mark, the 
rule of recognition introduces the idea of a legal system - for the rules are now not just a discrete 
unconnected set but are, in a simple way, unified.  Hart observes that, even in simple cases in which 
the rule of recognition is simply an authoritative list of rules, we have the germ of the idea of legal 
validity (Hart 1994: 95). It is the common and shared respect for the rule of recognition that 
                                                     
19  Atzori 2017. 
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provides the characteristic unity and continuity of a legal system, and this depends on acceptance 
of common standards of legal validity (Hart 1994: 116). 
 
By contrast, under public blockchain’s current internal governance framework, there is no 
common and shared acceptance of an agreed, formal procedure through which the primary rules 
(comprised of the core software code and protocols upon and through which the network operates) 
can be recognised and authoritatively identified.    Instead, public blockchains rely on economic 
incentives that are encoded into the blockchain protocol (e.g. the so-called ‘longest chain’ rule) 
that, if there is a disagreement about which software version represents the rules for the blockchain, 
nodes can be expected, out of rational commercial self-interest, to mine the longer chain because 
the tokens mined on the shorter chain would not generate any mining rewards.    But the 
experience of forking on Bitcoin (and the Ethereum hard fork following the DAO hack), 
demonstrates that miners do not necessarily act in predictable, rationally self-interested ways.  As 
a result, there can be continued and on-going uncertainty about which primary rules are 
authoritative, and, in turn, which copy of the ledger should be regarded as authoritative at any 
given point in time, seriously undermining the unity of the blockchain system. 
4.2 Ossification 
In addition, the lack of any formal rules and procedures for authoritatively changing the primary 
rules (ie making changes to the software code which constitute the primary rules of the network 
and to guarantee their implementation), undermines the capacity of the network to sustain itself 
over time.  Hence there is on-going risk that the code becomes ‘ossified’ because it has no formal 
mechanism to enable the code to be altered in order to respond and adapt to changes in the larger 
environment in which the system works to meet the needs of the user community.  Thus not only 
are there no individuals with formal responsibility for maintaining the software and addressing any 
‘bugs’ identified in the code, but if some kind of ‘crisis’ occurs (such as the DAO hack, for example) 
which may require the implementation of alterations, no-one within the network has the formal 
responsibility to respond (Walch 2017). 
4.3 Instability and volatility 
At the same time, the ever-present risk of forking reduces both the stability and value of the entire 
network. As Walch observes  
 
if these structures fragment, there is no longer a single authoritative data structure, but many, greatly 
undermining the technology’s service as a single, reliable source of truth: Walch 2017:15.  
 
The absence of any adjudicatory body within the network with formal responsibility to 
authoritatively determine disputes concerning the meaning and significance of the application of 
the primary rules (ie contained in the software code) means that, when disputes arise concerning 
whether the execution of the primary rules reflect and conform to the underlying principles of the 
network and how it should be expected to operate, this threatens the unity of the network, allowing 
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rival interpretations by users (passive and active nodes), and which can precipitate the 
fragmentation of the network via forking.20   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This article has critically examined the prospects of public blockchains to form the foundational 
governance architecture for peaceful social co-operation between strangers without the need for 
conventional third-party social intermediaries (ie the state, banks), based on the current internal 
governance frameworks upon which they operate. Their capacity to do so rests on a belief that 
conventional third-party or ‘trusted’ intermediaries are no longer necessary because the blockchain 
code can be relied upon exclusively to ensure the reliability, stability and future durability of the 
system to facilitate the requisite trust and coordination (de Filippi and Loveluck 2016: 11).   But 
experience has vividly demonstrated that public blockchains are not, in practice, governed 
exclusively by code.  Rather, their operation and continued viability inevitably and unavoidably 
relies on social mechanisms that entail reliance upon and engagement with the messy and complex 
realities and variety of human motivations, behaviour, and decision-making in order to ensure 
their continued operation and their capacity to adapt to the changing needs of their communities 
and their dynamic external environment.   
 
By drawing on Hart’s concept of law, who argues that modern legal system are formed by the 
union of a system of primary and secondary rules of recognition, change and adjudication, our 
analysis demonstrates that public blockchains are currently governed through primary rules 
(comprised of the core software protocols that constitute the network and its operation) without an 
accompanying set of ‘secondary rules’ of recognition, change and adjudication.  As a result, they 
cannot be expected to operate (and are unlikely to operate) as unified, self-sustaining and stable 
systems of governance, and this has direct implications for the promise and potential of blockchain 
as a mechanism for facilitating cooperation between strangers.  Because public blockchains lack 
what Hart calls ‘secondary rules’ of internal governance that operate in conjunction with public 
blockchain’s primary rules (comprised of the rules encoded in the technical architecture and 
software through which public blockchains are configured and operationalised) they provide poor 
guarantees of reliability.   The current reliance of public blockchains on informal social 
mechanisms, economic incentives and the informal charismatic authority of individual core 
developers to sustain their operations over time, means that these systems cannot be relied upon to 
provide stable, predictable and enduring foundations (or what Simpson calls ‘predictive trust’ 
(Simpson 2017: 113) for facilitating peaceful social co-operation between strangers.  
 
Rather, our analysis suggests that, under their current internal governance frameworks, public 
blockchain systems are inherently unstable and vulnerable to fragmentation in the absence of any 
authoritative means to identify and ensure implementation of the primary code, to authoritatively 
                                                     
20  The Bitcoin hash-wars offer a lesson in research methodology: the limitations of a purely theoretical 
approach to blockchain (ie ‘white paper’ analysis) as opposed to one that regards its interaction with the social 
world and surrounding context as vital and indispensable to a clear-eyed understanding of its operation, 
potential and limitations.  This does not however detract from understanding the Nakamoto White Paper 
as a theoretically robust and elegant proposal to the problem of cooperation between strangers – but its 
capacity to facilitate the delivery of essential social goods (eg facilitating social cooperation) cannot be 
evaluated in purely theoretical or technological terms. 
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initiate and implement changes to the primary code, nor procedures for authoritatively resolving 
disputes arising between members of the blockchain community.  Accordingly, the continued and 
reliable functioning of public blockchains is neither guaranteed nor predictable, given the ever-
present risk of forking, undermining the unity of the system and the notion of a single chain of 
truth upon which the value of public blockchains as a ‘trustless’ technology for facilitating social 
interaction between strangers ultimately depends.  In other words, unless the internal governance 
of public blockchains can be reformed in ways that establish meaningful and effective ‘secondary 
rules’ of recognition, change and adjudication that command the acceptance and respect of 
blockchain communities, they will never scale for practical use cases in the real world in ways that 
seriously affect the rights, interest and legitimate expectations of individuals, at least in highly 
industrialised countries with a deep and stable commitment to the rule of law, and will merely 
remain the province of hobbyists with marginal and relatively minor practical significance. 
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